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Abstract—It is well acknowledged that one of the key enabling
factors for the realization of future 5G networks will be the small
cell (SC) technology. Furthermore, recent advances in the fields
of network functions virtualization (NFV) and software-defined
networking (SDN) open up the possibility of deploying advanced
services at the network edge. In the context of mobile/cellular
networks this is referred to as mobile edge computing (MEC).
Within the scope of the EU-funded research project SESAME
we perform a comprehensive security modelling of MEC-assisted
quality-of-experience (QoE) enhancement of fast moving users in
a virtualized SC wireless network, and demonstrate it through a
representative scenario toward 5G. Our modelling and analysis is
based on a formal security requirements engineering methodology
called Secure Tropos which has been extended to support MEC-
based SC networks. In the proposed model, critical resources
which need protection, and potential security threats are iden-
tified. Furthermore, we identify appropriate security constraints
and suitable security mechanisms for 5G networks. Thus, we
reveal that existing security mechanisms need adaptation to face
emerging security threats in 5G networks.
Keywords—Security modelling; small cells; mobile edge com-
puting; virtualization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The widespread of end user devices with advanced capa-
bilities, such as smartphones and tablet computers, has led
to the appearance of a wide rage of mobile applications.
At the same time, novel services are being introduced by
mobile network operators (MNOs). This situation imposes
very strict requirements on the existing infrastructure and
communication technologies. The challenge becomes greater
as devices are also expected to actively communicate with a
multiplicity of equipment (sensors, smart meters, etc.) within a
fully converged framework of heterogeneous network (HetNet)
infrastructure [1].
Hence, in the recent years the evolution of mobile net-
works has more demanding requirements in terms of capacity,
quality-of-experience (QoE), energy efficiency, and cost reduc-
tion. Research efforts towards next-generation 5G networks
explore a number of emerging technologies, such as the small
cell (SC) technology [2], wireless network virtualization [3],
network functions virtualization (NFV) [4], software-defined
networking (SDN) [5], and self-organizing networks (SON)
[6]. The expected benefits, among others, include an increasing
throughput and network capacity on demand, support for lo-
calized services, and energy-efficient operation of base stations
(BSs).
A number of government and industry-funded R&D
projects are working towards defining and developing 5G
architectures, solutions, and technologies. For example, the
EU-funded SESAME project [7], [8] targets innovations in the
area of virtual small cells (VSCs) and the support of advanced
services at the network edge by embracing the concept of
mobile edge computing (MEC) [9]. The project also proposes
a SDN/NFV-enabled architecture for MEC services in 5G SC
networks. Recent studies indicate that the use of VSCs can
be a good alternative to classical HetNets concept [10]. The
main advantage of the VSC concept, in addition to the new
BS deployment cost reduction, is that the cellular network
coverage and capacity can be adjusted in real time in response
to dynamics of user demand and changing network conditions.
Many novel architectures and solutions that exploit the tech-
nologies of SDN, NFV, SON, and MEC, have been recently
proposed [11]–[15]. No doubt that the evolution towards 5G
will require the addition of new security features to protect
against emerging threats. However, there are not many studies
of tackling the 5G security issues, especially at the intersection
of different 5G technologies.
A recently started EU-funded 5G-ENSURE project [16]
aims at defining a 5G security architecture and developing
usable security enablers for 5G. A limited number of existing
works (e.g., [17]–[19]) mainly perform a high-level analysis of
emerging security challenges and threats. For example, in [19]
the prominent threats and vulnerabilities MEC-enabled SC net-
works have been identified and classified. The aforementioned
works, however, do not propose formal methods or techniques
for a secure design of 5G networks and its components. Our
current work tries to fill in this gap for virtualized 5G SC
networks. We perform security modelling and analysis of the
main components of the SESAME architecture. In particular,
we consider a realistic and representative 5G scenario: enhanc-
ing the QoE of fast moving users using MEC. To this end, we
adopt a methodology for security requirements engineering,
known as Secure Tropos [20], and extend it to enable security
modelling and analysis of the main elements of the SESAME
architecture. The proposed methodology has been implemented
using the SecTro - a computer-aided software engineering
(CASE) tool. Our methodology and the developed tool enable
TABLE I. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
BS Base Station
CASE Computer-Aided Software Engineering
CESC Cloud Enabled Small Cell
CESCM CESC Manager
DC Data Center
DoS Denial of Service
EMS Element Management System
EPC Evolved Packet Core
EU End User
HetNet Heterogeneous Network
MCN Mobile Core Network
MEC Mobile Edge Computing
MNO Mobile Network Operator
MOCN Multi-Operator Core Network
NFV Network Functions Virtualization
QoE Quality of Experience
RAN Radio Access Network
SC Small Cell
SDN Software-Defined Networking
SLA Service Level Agreement
SON Self-Organizing Network
SP Service Provider
UE User Equipment
VIM Virtual Infrastructure Manager
VM Virtual Machine
VNF Virtual Network Function
VSC Virtual Small Cell
formal specification of components and resources to be pro-
tected, identification of security constrains, and enforcement of
appropriate security mechanisms. One of the big advantages
of the developed tool is that the validation of conformance to
specified security constraints can be performed very quickly
and in real time. Although in this work we mainly focus on
the radio access network (RAN), VSCs, and MEC servers, the
methodology has the potential to be extended in other domains,
too.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
briefly presents the existing works on 5G security. Section
III describes the SESAME architecture for virtualized 5G SC
networks. Section IV describes our considered 5G scenario
and presents our security modelling approach. We conclude
and discuss our future work in Section V. Besides, in Table I
we present the list of abbreviations used in this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section we briefly discuss some recent and represen-
tative works on 5G network security. In [17], a wide range of
possible threats and attacks against the main 5G components
have been investigated. The main focus is on security issues
related to the user equipment (UE) and access networks.
Different types of attacks, such as denial of service (DoS),
tampering, and eavesdropping, have been studied and analyzed.
Finally, potential mitigation techniques and future solutions
have been discussed. In [18], a high level security architecture
for 5G networks has been proposed. The introduced security
framework enables 5G infrastructure and component protec-
tion. In particular, the framework integrates the following
modules: authentication, encryption, unified access and unified
security. The main focus of [18] is on threats originating
from wireless local networks and UE. The proposed approach,
however, does not take into consideration the peculiarities of
emerging SDN, NFV, and MEC technologies, and their impact
on 5G systems. In [21], the security aspects of SDN-enabled
5G networks have been addressed. A number of potential
threats and attack vectors, such as DoS, privacy violation
attacks, location spoofing attacks, and physical tampering
attacks, have been studied and analyzed. Also, the problems
of security policies management and secure tunneling have
been discussed. The proposed security architecture includes
a security gateway and a cluster of SDN controllers that are
responsible for user authentication and firewalling. In [22], the
security handover authentication and privacy protection in 5G
is discussed. The focus is on 5G SCs and HetNets protection
using SDN technology. The fact that a SDN controller has
a global view of the network enables fast network reconfig-
urability and adaptation to changing network conditions. It
also helps reducing redundant authentication across HetNets.
Matlab-based simulations show low authentication delays and
high network utilization of the proposed SDN-assisted authen-
tication scheme. Finally, in [23], the multi-tenant MEC services
have been modeled and analyzed from the security viewpoint
using the Secure Tropos methodology.
III. THE SESAME FUNCTIONAL ARCHITECTURE
In this section we present the cellular network architecture
developed in the context of the EC 5G-PPP SESAME project
[7]. Herein, we only describe the elements relevant to our
security requirements modelling that will follow. More details
on the SESAME architecture and the considered scenarios can
be found in [8], [13].
One of the key elements of this architecture is the incor-
poration of MEC concepts at the RAN level, by enhancing
the VSCs with MEC servers. Another notable characteristic
is the multi-tenancy support. This has been achieved by SDN
and NFV technologies. The basic SESAME components are:
(i) MEC server: Specialised hardware that is placed inside
the SC and provides processing power, memory and storage
capabilities, and networking resources; (ii) cloud enabled small
cell (CESC): A SC that has been enhanced with a MEC server;
(iii) CESC cluster: A group of collocated and coordinated
CESCs; (iv) virtual infrastructure manager (VIM): An entity
responsible for the management of the virtual hardware (i.e.,
virtual machines (VMs)) and networking resources of a single
MEC server. The VIM is responsible for the lifecycle, pro-
vision, placement, and operation of VMs. The VIM is also
responsible for the allocation of virtual network functions
(VNFs) and for the control of virtual networks and storage
resources across VNF instances. Finally, the VIM also man-
ages the interaction of a VNF with the compute, storage,
and network resources; (v) CESC manager (CESCM): An
entity responsible for managing and orchestrating the cloud
environment of CESCs. It can manage at the same time
multiple clusters, a single cluster, or a single CESC. The
CESCM orchestrates services and consequently manages the
VIM to compose them with virtual resources. The CESCM
also manages the radio access and SONs self-x functionalities,
e.g., self-optimising, self-healing, self-configuring of the SCs
contained in each CESC cluster.
One important feature of the SESAME architecture is the
formation of a light data center (DC) at the network edge.
This is achieved via a distributed and logically grouped set of
MEC servers, which are parts of the CESC cluster. The clusters
are able to communicate with each other as well as with the
Fig. 1. 5G scenario: Enhancing QoE of fast moving users [13].
evolved packet core (EPC). In addition to providing radio
coverage and orchestration of multi-tenancy, a CESC provides
a platform for MEC to support low latency and compute
intensive applications and services. Hence, the end users (EUs)
benefit from fast and cost-effective access to a wide range
of innovative services and applications. At the CESC cluster
level, the virtualization layer decouples the VNF software from
the underlying hardware. The element management system
(EMS) performs management of one or more VNFs (e.g, local
gateways or multi-operator core network (MOCN) functions).
A cluster of CESCs is managed by the CESCM that
constitutes: a VNF orchestrator, a VNF manager, and an EMS
virtualization. The VNF manager is responsible for the VNF
lifecycle management. Typical operations of the VNF manager
include: i) instantiation of VNFs, ii) scaling of VNFs, iii)
updating and/or upgrading VNFs, and iv) termination of VNFs.
By leveraging on the monitoring mechanisms, the VNF man-
ager is able to apply policies for network service level rescaling
and reconfiguration to achieve high resource utilization. The
VNF orchestrator is in charge of the orchestration and manage-
ment of the NFV infrastructure. It is also responsible for the
allocation of software resources and for realizing the network
services. In particular, the VNF orchestrator has the ability to
coordinate, authorize, release, and engage NFV infrastructure
resources independently of any specific VIM. Finally, the VNF
orchestrator composes service chains (constituted by two or
more VNFs located either in one or several CESCs) and
manages the deployment of VNFs over the light DC.
IV. SECURITY MODELLING: ENHANCING THE QOE OF
FAST MOVING USERS USING MEC
A. Scenario Description
In our considered scenario, shown in Fig. 1, a CESC
Provider manages a number of distributed CESC clusters,
with each one covering a geographically contiguous area. We
consider a single service provider (SP) that supports a number
of EUs via the CESC infrastructure. Service level agreements
(SLAs) regulate the interaction of CESC Provider, SP, and
Fig. 2. SecTro: Actors and their dependencies.
EUs. A reference EU moves between different CESC clusters
and requires service continuity and appropriate QoE. We as-
sume that the EU moves at a high speed and consumes a high-
definition real-time content that has tight delay requirements.
This scenario exploits the particular advantages of MEC, since
MEC servers are deployed at the network edge and, hence, are
able to provide low latency, location awareness, and improved
QoE for real-time high-demand applications. In this scenario,
it is crucial to enable smooth service execution and to preserve
adequate QoE levels when the EU moves both between CESCs
and between clusters.
The application of the MEC paradigm allows for an effi-
cient monitoring of the user location and its related radio con-
ditions, with real-time reporting and fast coordination. Also,
the adoption of MEC servers at the CESC clusters ensures
smooth handover between cells and clusters. The enhanced
support for the EU mobility has been realized by implementing
appropriate SON’s self-x control functions at the macro cell
level. These functions take advantage of edge monitoring
capabilities to seamlessly manage the handover process across
neighboring cells. Finally, the deployment of low-latency edge
caches at the MEC servers allows fast and efficient access to
the cached content [24]. When the mobility pattern of the EU
is known or can be predicted (e.g., if monitored through signal
inspection), the caches can help offloading EU’s data storage
tasks to the CESC.
B. Security Requirements Modelling
In Figs. 2 and 3 we present the Secure Tropos modelling
for the considered scenario using the developed SecTro CASE
tool. Figure 2 presents the actors and their dependencies. We
identify five major actors, namely CESC, CESCM, Mobile Op-
erator, Macro Cell (i.e., macro BS), and EU. The EU requires
macro cell radio access and local radio access via CESC. The
CESC depends on the CESCM for management purposes and
on the Mobile Operator for backhaul connectivity. The Mobile
Operator may also require cluster management functionality
that is provided by the CESCM.
Figure 3 shows the security components view for the
CESCM, who is one of the main actors in the considered
Fig. 3. SecTro: Security components view for the CESCM.
scenario. The following three critical resources have been
identified and will need protection: VNF Manager, NFV Or-
chestrator, and Radio Access Manager. In this example, the
CESCM’s primary goals, which depend on the aforementioned
critical resources, are: VNF lifecycle management, Orchestra-
tion of virtual resources, and Management of radio resources.
According to the Secure Tropos methodology, an actor’s goal
may be restricted by one or more security constraints. In this
example, the constraints for the aforementioned goals are:
Separate memory space for different VMs, Prevent control
and management attacks, and Prevent unauthorized access to
radio resources. The security constraints have to be satisfied
by the following three security objectives: VM data protection,
Ensure control and management protection, and Ensure legit-
imate access to radio resources. The corresponding security
mechanisms to implement these objectives are VM isolation,
Intrusion detection, and Access control. We also consider the
following security threats on the critical resources: Buffer over-
flow attack, Resource exhaustion attack, and Control hijacking.
The Buffer overflow attack threat can be mitigated by the
Separate memory space for different VMs security constraint.
The Resource exhaustion attack can be mitigated by the Pre-
vent unauthorized access to radio resources security constraint.
Finally, the Control hijacking can be mitigated by the Prevent
control and management attacks security constraint.
The SecTro tool also allows us to model the details of a
specific security mechanism in use. For example, the Authen-
tication mechanism could be implemented using a challenge-
response protocol, as shown in Fig. 4. This approach requires
that each EU shares a secret key with the Authentication
Server. When the Authentication Server receives a service
request from the EU, it will generate and send back a unique
challenge. The EU will send back the encrypted challenge.
The encryption will be done using the shared secret key. The
Authentication Server will decrypt the received message and if
Fig. 4. SecTro: Modelling the Authentication mechanism.
the result matches the challenge, this proves that the EU has a
valid key and hence has been authenticated. Note, that this is a
single-factor authentication. That is, possessing a valid secret
key is a sufficient condition for the EU to get authenticated. For
interactions that require high levels of security or in cases of
emergency situations, such as natural disasters or cyber attacks,
multi-factor authentication would be more appropriate [25].
C. Security Considerations
Particular attention must be paid on protecting user’s data
and confidentiality. Some data or code, including various
configuration settings and security policies, can be altered.
This is a particularly important issue in a virtualised multi-
tenant environment [26]. It must be taken into account that
some tenants could be malicious. Hence, adequate data and
VM isolation for different tenants must be ensured. This could
be done, for example at the database level or at the hardware
level. Also, in some cases, sensitive information of a tenant
may be leaked and made available to the adversary or to a
malicious tenant.
Another important security threat is the unauthorized ac-
cess to SC radio resources (physical or virtual) and MEC
resources. Given the increasing trend of outsourcing data and
applications, an adequate security solution must ensure that
only authorized entities gain access. Also, the insider threat
should be considered and appropriate mechanisms must be
put in place for preventing service providers from misusing
tenants’ data.
Particular attention must also be paid on appropriate en-
cryption methods. Weaknesses or improper use of crypto-
graphic mechanisms may lead to security breaches in authenti-
cation processes and data confidentiality. Also, the generation
of cryptographic keys shouldn’t rely on weak random number
generators. Other security problems may arise due to com-
munication protocols that use weak cryptographic primitives.
Hence, it should be ensured that the cryptographic security
controls are in place. To ensure appropriate levels of protection,
new multi-domain and multi-service trust models need to be
considered. Also, encrypted communications and authentica-
tion of edge devices (such as MEC servers) will play an
important role due to incorporation of MEC services.
Control hijacking attacks are expected to be a serious threat
in SDN-based 5G networks. By exploiting the SDN controller
implementation weaknesses, the adversary may try to divert
the control flows to a controlled device. Then the captured
messages can be discarded preventing the data plane entities
from proper operation. In a more advanced case, the captured
messages may be manipulated with a special purpose code and
sent into the network.
Another serious type of attacks is the DoS leading to
switched off or malfunctioning SC, or unavailable MEC
servers. Also, a DoS attack against the hypervisor can cause
service disruption and data loss. Yet, in a multi-tenant environ-
ment, security implications that may arise due weak isolation
between tenants may allow adversaries to compromise more
than one tenants upon compromising one of the other tenants.
Furthermore, it has been shown that a DoS attack may be
launched from within the SC [27].
V. CONCLUSION
Having facilitated by the advances of the EU-funded
SESAME project, we study the security of virtualized small
cell networks enhanced with MEC capabilities. We have mod-
elled a representative 5G scenario using the Secure Tropos
methodology. The proposed model has been implemented
using a CASE tool, called SecTro. The tool enables security
modeling and analysis of the involved actors. In particular,
initially we identify the critical resources to be protected and
potential security threats. Next, we identify appropriate secu-
rity constraints and suitable security mechanisms. It is evident
that the existing security mechanisms need to be adapted to
address the emerging security threats in 5G networks. On the
other hand, the incorporation of SDN and NFV technologies
into 5G networks, and the introduction of intelligent network
edge devices, as facilitated by MEC, enable the development of
novel security concepts and mechanisms. In our future work,
we intend to study a wider range of different 5G scenarios from
the security viewpoint. We will also focus on the appropriate
selection of mitigation mechanisms by taking into account the
emerging threats to 5G networks.
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